

≡ New Thinking on an Old Conflict ≡

A Compendium of Policy Plans



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Table of content

Introduction	4
Chairwoman of My Israel	
From the Editor	5
Facts and Figures	6
Full Sovereignty	
Bezalel Smotrich	14
Moshe Feiglin	16
Haetzni Family	20
Caroline Glick	24
Partial Sovereignty	
Yoav Kisch	30
Yoaz Hendel	34
Yisrael (Robert) Aumann	36
Naftali Bennett	38
Regional Plan	
Amir Avivi and Benjamin Anthony	44
Yigal Cohen-Orgad	48
District Plan	
Dr. Mordechai Kedar	54

Dear readers,

We are at a historically significant juncture in time. For years, the right in Israel has conducted a heroic battle to prevent the two-state plan and partition of the land. In practice, Israel's withdrawals have brought only hopelessness, bloodshed and a loss of security, further to a disconnection from the values of the Land of Israel and a loss of affinity to the land.

The current geopolitical situation in Judea and Samaria means that we must find new and creative ways to set policy in the region: in Judea and Samaria in particular, in Israel and – taking a bird's-eye view – in the Middle East as a whole. We must take responsibility for our fate, while remaining true to our values and ideology, without forgetting the pragmatic aspects as we address the “why” without neglecting the “how.”

After decades of talking mostly about what not to do and what is too dangerous to do, we are now ready to talk about what we should do – and how to do it. And we will do it out of a sense of real responsibility for our fate and a desire to shape Israel's future.

Although dealing with the “conflict” is intense and messy, it is tremendously important. We are pushing aside what has been until now the only plan on the table – the “two-state solution” – in favor of other plans, creative directions and new horizons. A complex conflict deserves a complex plan rather than utopian slogans that gamble with our fate.

The situation in Judea and Samaria is complex and requires innovative thinking that goes beyond the tried-and-tested paradigms. Only by gaining a nuanced understanding of the situation on the ground and its various components will it be possible to grow and develop alternatives that are in touch with the facts and the vision, and that address the issue in the best way possible.

Make no mistake. The discussion here emanates from a clear point of departure: This land belongs to us, the people of Israel. It was not by chance that the Jewish people come to the Land of Israel to build its national home in it. Judea and Samaria are an integral part of the Zionist and Jewish story and their importance is crucial in every sense. With the importance comes the complexity, and rather than ignore the challenges, we face them head on.

It is important to lay the guidelines on the table: It would be a mistake to expect to come up with a holistic plan that addresses all the problems and challenges. A forward-looking plan should be based on principles that move in parallel, with maximum flexibility. Furthermore, it does not make sense to look for an immediate solution; instead, we have to lay down the guidelines for a gradual formula, one that can be adapted to the momentous changes occurring in the Middle East.

The ideas presented in this booklet are complex, groundbreaking, daring and novel. They address distinct parameters and have been edited to enable ease of reading. This is an important national mission, and we are ready and willing to take on the challenges without evading them.

I wish you a pleasant read with an open mind.

Sara Haetzni-Cohen
Chair of My Israel



**“This is the true realism: To strive for greatness without
making light of lesser achievements.”**

Menachem Begin

For decades now, despite no shortage of intellectuals and political leaders and theorists, the main idea reverberating in the marketplace of political ideas has been the one represented by the slogan “two states for two peoples.” Although every attempt to actualize the dream repeatedly crashed and burned in the face of reality, no other option has been brought to the Israeli negotiating table or marketplace of ideas. Sara Haetzni-Cohen, our intrepid chair, set out two and a half years ago on a voyage that sparked a discourse that today seems almost self-evident: a voyage to explore other options.

In recent years, we have been hearing new voices offering new alternatives. Politicians, military leaders, academicians and ordinary citizens have been taking a closer look at the reality of the Zionist enterprise and are proposing ways to address the crucial and far-reaching issues that face it: demographics, identity, human rights, economics, security and social resilience.

This booklet is a compendium of the most distinctive new ideas currently being floated. Each plan presented here was held to clear criteria: Where will the new borders be drawn? Who will control the territory? How will the question of citizenship and rights be addressed?

The plans presented here have already appeared over the years on various platforms: most were laid out in the weekend editions of Makor Rishon as part of a series of interviews Sara Haetzni-Cohen held starting in the summer of 2016; some are online, on designated websites or in YouTube videos; and some have been published in additional written media, such as the journal Hashiloach.

We can (and should) discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each plan. However, one thing should be borne in mind: It takes courage and integrity to publish a blueprint of one’s own, especially for a public figure. It is much simpler to remain in the playing field of vague statements than to put one’s ideas out there, black on white, for the public to judge. During the editing process, I approached each of the conceivers of the various blueprints put forward in this booklet and invited them to review their plans, comment and further hone them. I was very happy to see that the vast majority readily accepted my invitation and agreed to give generously of their time to address the difficult questions, clarify, qualify and sometimes admit – with all due humility – that their plan, like every practical solution, has its drawbacks. I would like to sincerely thank all of them for the fascinating process. I consider this an outstanding example of leadership strongly connected to the people, of ideas connected to reality, and a demonstration that a good idea can be accessible and clear to anyone who wants to gain a genuine understanding of it.

Other ideas exist, but not all have made it into this compendium. Constructive discussions and initiatives abound. The paradigm has been changed. It is clear to all that Israel must prioritize its own national interests and take unilateral steps; it is clear to all that a solution to the conflict must necessarily improve the lives of individuals; more and more voices are calling to cancel the Oslo Accords and to start thinking differently.

The right in Israel is engaged, intelligent and no less important – aware of the difficulties. The right is committed to peace and human rights no less than to the integrity of the land, and is an ethical right whose hope and vision are remote from destructive messianism. It is a right that is well acquainted with the art of compromise and is ready to provide refreshing answers to longstanding questions.

The time is ripe to end the stagnation and start building Israel’s tomorrow.

Leora Levian
Editor

114 square
kilometers
the total area of Jewish settlements

435,000
Jewish residents


1,800,000
Arab residents



About
5,700 square
kilometers
the area of Judea and Samaria
125 kilometers
long **25-50** kilometers
wide

27,800 square
kilometers
the area of the State of Israel

Judea and Samaria cover about
20%
of the territory between the Jordan River
and the Mediterranean Sea



Any discussion of the future of Judea and Samaria must be based on the facts and on a thorough familiarity with the territory. To that end, we present here a number of basic concepts and some important background data that will form the basis for the discussions that follow. A perusal of the concepts will show that the reality on the ground is extraordinarily complicated, which is why we made every effort to present them in straightforward language, accessible to those who do not have legal training too. Almost every fact and figure related to Judea and Samaria is in dispute (even seemingly objective data, such as the number of Jewish communities), and for that reason, we have noted the source of the data in those places where it was necessary.

The division of the territory in the Oslo Accords: Areas A, B and C

In the context of the Oslo Accords, control over civilian and security matters in Judea and Samaria was divided between the Palestinian Authority and the State of Israel. This division has three levels:

Area A covers approximately 18% of Judea and Samaria and is under the absolute control of the Palestinian Authority, for both security and civil matters. Israelis have been forbidden to enter Area A since 2000 (although the ban is enforced mainly towards Israeli Jews). The IDF re-entered the Palestinian city centers in Area A due to the Palestinian Authority's ineffectiveness in face of the rampant terror of the Second Intifada. Since then, the IDF has entered Area A almost freely to eradicate and prevent terrorism.

Area B covers approximately 22% of the territory and is under the control of the Palestinian Authority for civil matters and under Israel's control regarding security matters. Area B includes the rural areas that contain villages that are smaller than cities in the vicinity of Jewish settlements.

Area C covers approximately 60% of the territory of Judea and Samaria and is under full Israeli control. The area includes all the Jewish settlements and the roads leading to them, military fire zones, bases and open spaces. Area C is an area with territorial contiguity, and in it live all the Jews that reside in Judea and Samaria, as well as an estimated 100,000 Arabs.

The actors on the ground

Because Israeli law has not been applied in Judea and Samaria, both security and civil matters are addressed by branches of the IDF, in coordination (when relevant) with the Palestinian Authority. The absence of Israeli sovereignty has created a vacuum into which numerous entities have entered, the large number of which increases the complexity (and some might say chaos) of handling civil affairs in Judea and Samaria for Jews and Arabs alike.

IDF – The IDF is responsible for routine security in Areas C and B, and carries out special operations and arrests in Area A when deemed necessary.

Palestinian Authority (PA) – The PA is the official Palestinian governmental body established as part of the Oslo Accords. The PA controls almost all of the Palestinian population in Judea and Samaria, and is responsible for civil affairs (health, education, economics, etc.) in areas A and B, and for security in Area A. At its disposal are various security organizations such as the PA police force, intelligence services, etc., which in principle operate in coordination with the IDF, although they have often been full partners to terrorist acts too, with the best-remembered example being the bloody lynching in Ramallah of two IDF reservists, which took place in 2000 inside a police station with the active participation of local police officers.

GOC Central Command – Since the State of Israel has taken upon itself the provisions of the laws of war of international law, the legal authority in Judea and Samaria – in accordance with the provisions of these laws – is the area's military commander. In practice, the commander is the GOC Central Command, in whose sector Judea and Samaria are located. Any action or change in legal status in Judea and Samaria must receive the GOC Central Command's authorization.

Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) – COGAT is an IDF officer with the rank of Major General who heads the defense ministry unit responsible for carrying out government policy in Judea and Samaria. COGAT is responsible for coordination between the government, the IDF, the Palestinian Authority, international organizations and civil society organizations – as well as all matters related to civil life throughout the West Bank (of Jews and Arabs alike) – for example, the creation of infrastructures, planning of settlements, etc.), as well as all security matters.

Civil Administration – The Civil Administration is a military body charged with managing civil affairs in Judea and Samaria, subject to COGAT's authorization. The various units of the Civil Administration serve in a role that approximates that of government ministries, with each office responsible for a different area: water, electricity, welfare, employment, land, environmental quality, archeology, transportation, etc. The Civil Administration also has a supervisory unit that addresses matters of law enforcement in Area C, and in addition, is responsible for the administrative aspects relating to Judea and Samaria's Arab residents, such as permits to enter Israel, vehicle traffic permits, etc.

District Coordination and Liaison (DCL) – The DCL is a representative of COGAT, and it serves to coordinate between the Palestinian civilian population and the IDF and the state Israel. Palestinian residents may go directly to the DCL office nearest to their home during reception hours to arrange civil matters such as work permits and permits to enter Israel. Apart from providing services to the Palestinian population, the DCO is also responsible for coordination between the IDF and the PA security apparatuses on routine security matters, and for the enforcement of planning and building laws in Area C.

International organizations – More than 100 organizations and consulates are involved in various projects in Judea and Samaria, ranging from welfare and relief to infrastructure and construction. Many of them coordinate directly with COGAT, but many others (certainly those with a political agenda) act on their own and eschew cooperation with anyone perceived as an arm of the Israeli occupation.

Palestinian demographics

The number of Arab residents in Judea and Samaria is a controversial issue because the normal authoritative sources, especially the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), have been found to be unreliable. For example, the Palestinian CBS has counted the 300,000 residents of east Jerusalem twice, and continues to count those who have emigrated from Judea and Samaria for longer than a year. A study conducted by the American-Israeli Demographic Research Group, led by Yoram Ettinger, is based on different data – such as the figures provided by the Palestinian Ministry of Health (MoH) regarding the number of injections given to children – to arrive at more accurate data. The conclusion of the American-Israeli Demographic Research Group is that in 2017, the number of Palestinians in Judea and Samaria did not exceed 1.8 million.

What law applies to Judea and Samaria?

Over the years, the State of Israel has refrained from applying Israeli law to Judea and Samaria. Israeli law applies to the Jewish residents of Judea and Samaria but not to the territory of Judea and Samaria. That is, laws such as income tax, supervision of products, etc. apply to Area C, but real estate laws and building and construction laws do not (in legalese this is known as personal, non-territorial law).

Territorial laws, such as real estate law, and the personal law that applies to the Palestinian residents of Area C derive from two layers of legal systems: the first is the law that applied in the territory until 1967, i.e., Ottoman law, with the addition of the changes introduced there by the British Mandate authorities and later by the Jordanian government (the State of Israel decided that since it had not annexed the territory, it would respect the legal system that preceded its capture of the territory); and the second is the orders of the GOC by means of which the State of Israel introduces required legal changes. The Supreme Court also applied Israeli labor law to Palestinians working inside Israeli settlements, by virtue of the principle of equality and the force of international law.

What is the status of the State of Israel in Judea and Samaria?

A bitter dispute is being waged in the legal and political arena over whether the area of Judea and Samaria should be officially designated as “occupied” territory or territory in a state of “belligerent occupation,” with each definition having its own far-reaching legal implications.

The traditional position of the State of Israel, as it has been presented over the years in the High Court of Justice, is that Judea and Samaria are “administered territories” to which Israel voluntarily applies the provisions of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Nevertheless, many argue that the State of Israel is an occupying power, and thus subject to the many legal restrictions that may apply to such a power. For those making this claim, the very fact that Israel is holding onto Judea and Samaria is fundamentally illegal. Although this is a widely accepted position today in the world, a legal analysis of the relevant issues poses serious challenges to this position. First, because an analysis of the Fourth Geneva Convention shows that it does not refer to a reality of the kind that has taken shape in Israel, a fact attested to by some of the authors of the Convention itself; second, the international laws of occupation do not

prohibit a state from the act of occupation per se, but rather only determine the rules in the context of which the occupier must conduct itself in the occupied territory. Article 43 of the Hague Convention (1907) is the foundational source for the obligations of the occupying power, and from it, it follows that occupation per se is not prohibited by law. A prohibition against occupation can arise only from a specific resolution by the United Nations Security Council – however in respect to Israel, the resolution does not require it to withdraw unconditionally from all the territories, but rather only in the context of a peace agreement. “Peace” should fundamentally include a reality in which Israel’s security is guaranteed. Consequently, there is no impediment in terms of international law to Israel continuing to hold onto the territory until an arrangement that secures its defense in the context of a peace agreement has been obtained; and third, Israel has the strongest claim to the territory – a claim greater than that of Jordan, which annexed the area after 1948 and whose annexation was never recognized by the international community, and a claim greater than that of the Palestinians, who never had sovereignty over Judea and Samaria.

Article 5 of the British Mandate states that “No Palestine territory shall be ceded or leased to, or in any way placed under the control of, the Government of any foreign Power.” Since the mandate was conferred upon Britain by the League of Nations (at the San Remo Conference in 1920), the contents of the Mandate constitute international recognition of the right of the Jewish national home to be the sole sovereign over the territory of the western land of Israel. Upon the establishment of the United Nations, the writ of the mandate was enshrined in the UN Charter, which ratified all previous international agreements and laws (Chapter 12, Article 80). The UN partition plan, on which the UN General Assembly voted on November 29, 1947, did not abrogate the writ of the mandate, although it includes the establishment of an Arab state in part of the western land of Israel, because the Arab world, including the Arabs of Palestine rejected it and launched a war.

What is the status of Jewish settlement on the lands of Judea and Samaria?

The issue of real estate in Judea and Samaria is one of the most complex in Israeli law. Up until 1979, Jewish settlements were established by means of Military Expropriation Orders, with the IDF declaring that it needed the presence of Jewish communities in order to realize its security control in the area. In 1979, the Begin government decided that new settlements could only be built on land that is not privately owned, i.e. state land. At the same time, a lengthy and thorough process to mark exactly what lands were involved was carried out, led by legal expert Plia Albeck.

In 2012, the government established a committee headed by retired Supreme Court Justice Edmund Levy. The report of the committee (The Levy Report) stated that Jews have the right to settle anywhere in Judea and Samaria, and certainly in those parts that are under Israeli control, by virtue of the agreements with the Palestinian Authority (referring to the Oslo Accords).

Regulation Law

The Law for the Regulation of Settlement in Judea and Samaria is intended to formalize the status of homes built in good faith, partially or entirely on land that in retrospect turned out not to be clearly owned by the state. The law does not confiscate the land from its owners, but rather only the right to use the land, and compensates the owners paying them 125% of the value of the land’s use. Alternatively, landowners can request another piece of land. The law was passed by the Knesset in February 2017 but has been suspended by the High Court until the petitions filed against it have been heard.



Full Sovereignty



Full Sovereignty

Bezalel Smotritch

One Hope

The Israeli Decision Plan



Knesset Member and chair of the National Union-Tekuma faction in the Jewish Home, an attorney by training and founder of Regavim, an NGO that monitors illegal Arab construction in Israel and Judea and Samaria. In the 20th Knesset, he served as deputy Knesset Speaker, and was a member of the Knesset Finance Committee and the Internal Affairs and Environment Committee.

Rationale

"There will never be peace here as long as we continue to believe that this land is fated to hold two collectives with conflicting national aspirations. If we do, our grandchildren and great-grandchildren will be forced to continue to live by the sword. The Palestinian national movement is a movement aimed at undoing Zionism, and as such is incapable of making peace with it. This is why the Palestinians reject Israel's minimum demand to recognize its right to exist as a Jewish state. We Jews will never give up our national aspiration for an independent state in the Land of Israel, the only Jewish state in the world. That is why it is the Arab side that will have to give up its ambition to realize its national identity here in the Land of Israel."

- We need a plan that does not offer the continued management of a low-intensity conflict but rather one that makes a decision.
- The Zionist return of the Jewish people to its homeland is the most just and moral enterprise the world has seen in the last one hundred years from a historical, international and religious perspective. Believing in the justice of our cause is what gives us the moral legitimacy to prevail and to defeat the contradictory Arab aspiration.
- The challenges that the State of Israel must address are unprecedented, and consequently the solution can and must be original and unprecedented too. While there are other countries in a state of conflict, no other country was established after attempts to annihilate its entire people, is surrounded by a host of countries that seek to destroy it and is forced to contend with internal threats too.
- The statement that "terrorism stems from despair" is a lie. Terrorism is fueled by a hope to accomplish goals, the first of which is to weaken Israeli society and force it to agree to the establishment of an Arab state in the Land of Israel.
- The statement that it is impossible to "suppress" the Arab aspiration for national expression in Israel— is also incorrect. It succeeded with Israel's Arabs after the establishment of the state, and it can and should work the same way in Judea and Samaria.
- The morality of an action is measured by its outcome, which may not necessarily be evident at first glance. Because of our desire to be "moral" and not "rule over another people," we withdrew from the Gaza Strip. Since then, the lives of the Arab residents of the Gaza Strip have undoubtedly worsened considerably.
- A division into regional municipal administrations dismantles the

Palestinian national collective and the aspirations to realize it, but at the same time, preserves the tribal-clan division, thus making it possible to maintain a stable system to manage daily life.

Borders

- In the context of the plan, complete Israeli sovereignty will be applied to Judea and Samaria, infrastructures will be built for continued Jewish settlement and Jews will be encouraged to settle in the area.

Citizenship and rights

- The Arabs will be offered three options:
 1. Give up the Palestinian national aspiration and live in peaceful coexistence as residents.
 2. Voluntarily emigrate, with generous Israeli assistance.
 3. Those who continue to fight will be dealt with firmly by Israel's security forces.
- The residence model will be based on the self-management of communities divided into six municipal administrations without nationalistic features. The administrative areas will be divided according to the current distribution by clans: Hebron, Bethlehem, Ramallah, Jericho, Nablus and Jenin.
- To the extent that they do not pose a security threat, the residents of the municipal administrations will enjoy freedom of movement and access to Israeli communities in Judea and Samaria and the State of Israel.
- At the first stage, the residents' right to vote will be limited to municipal elections and they will not have the right to vote in Knesset elections. At a later stage, several options can be considered:
 1. To reach a broad regional agreement with Jordan in the context of which the Arabs of Judea and Samaria will vote for the Jordanian parliament.
 2. To introduce a constitutional change that will create two separate legislative houses in Israel – one in which only civil decisions are made and one in which national decisions are made – with the Arabs of Judea and Samaria voting only for the house involved in civil decisions.
 3. To grant full citizenship, including the right to vote for the Knesset, to those Arab residents who seek such a status and who are willing to demonstrate their complete loyalty to the Jewish state, including by doing full military service, similar to Israel's Druze citizens.

Control over the territory

- Municipal administrations will be responsible for economic and civil life, and will interact in these areas amongst themselves and between themselves and the various authorities in the State of Israel.
- Beyond the municipal jurisdictions, which will be administered just as they are all over Israel, the State of Israel will be the only sovereign in the entire land of Israel.

Moshe Feiglin

Sovereignty and Identity



Established the Zehut party and serves as its chair; was a Knesset Member for the Likud, a founder of Zo Artzeinu, a resistance movement to the Oslo Accords. He has written several books including War of Dreams and Where There Are No Men, which was recently republished with additions under the name The End of Normalcy.

Rationale

“I don’t want to start with the solution, but with the goal. When people ask ‘What is your solution?’ I respond: ‘Why the solution?’ The question is: Where do we want to go? My goal is to create a political infrastructure for the realization of the Jewish identity of the State of Israel. With Oslo, the left created a mindset. Today everybody still talks about two states and the partition of the land. We are prisoners of the Oslo mindset, both on the right and on the left, and that’s where it all starts.”

- The question that needs to be asked is what will contribute to (or harm) the existence of a flourishing Jewish state here for many generations to come. The solution should be long term and aim for “the eternity of Israel”: an eternal Jewish presence in the Land of Israel.
- “One people, one country, one God” – The State of Israel is the land of the Jewish people and should express the identity of the Jewish people. This concept includes the absolute negation of a “state of all its citizens,” a euphemistic formula that calls for stripping Israel of its unique Jewish character.
- The plan allows for the protection of human rights and minimal harm to them, in contrast to the harm that is currently being caused to both the Jewish and Arab populations.
- The State of Israel has grounds to cancel the Oslo Accords immediately, and accordingly to cancel the division into Areas A, B, and C.

Borders

- The plan calls for the application of full sovereignty throughout the land of Israel, with the Jordan River as the border.
- “He who controls the mountain controls the land” – The Waqf must be removed from the Temple Mount and Israeli sovereignty applied to it to formalize the Temple Mount as a Jewish holy site. The Temple Mount should be as safe and accessible to all as is the Western Wall, with the presence of an Israeli flag. Likewise, the State of Israel needs to amend the Holy Places Law and include the Temple Mount in it.

Citizenship and rights

- The Arab residents will be offered three options:
 1. Voluntary emigration in return for a generous migration grant.
 2. Permanent residency, similar to a “green card,” for those who openly declare loyalty to the State of Israel as the state of the Jewish people.
 3. A citizenship track for a small number, based on Israeli interests. This track is intended for those who link their fate to that of the Jewish people, as the Druze citizens of Israel currently do.
- The generous emigration grant will not come from the state budget, but from the resources currently allocated to the two-state solution, such as security, the terror victims department in the National Insurance Institute, the purchase of real estate from Palestinians who wish to emigrate, and more. A careful calculation shows that the State of Israel will benefit economically from such a step.
- Anyone who fights Israel or incites to terrorism will be eliminated or deported.

Control over the territory

- The State of Israel will be the sole party responsible for security between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, and after the imposition of full security control, sovereignty can also be applied. This does not require special legislation because the law passed by the first Knesset to apply sovereignty after Israel’s War of Independence is still in force.
- The Arab cities in Judea and Samaria will have Israeli police stations, as was the case before the Oslo Accords.
- State intervention should be minimal – in both Judea and Samaria and in Tel Aviv. The state will be responsible for security and the justice system, and everything else, such as education and health, will be in the hands of the citizens. The Arab residents of Judea and Samaria will pay taxes just like everyone else.

Questions

Do you think anyone will agree to voluntarily emigrate?

We conducted a small experiment in the context of which we published an ad on Arabic-language sites with an offer to emigrate and work in Germany. For this purpose, we found a staffing firm that said it had 30,000 jobs available. After only four hours, we were forced to remove the ads from the sites because we were inundated with applications. The data support the success of the program: the need among the Arabs, our desire and regarding that of third parties – that is, the absorbing countries – in countries such as Canada, I was told that “Anyone who arrives with \$50,000 in their pocket will receive the red-carpet treatment.” You have to understand that the world today is crying out for people willing to work, and now the question is who they will get: the Sudanese immigrant who built mud huts, or the immigrant from Ramallah who built the Azrieli Towers and will arrive with tens of thousands of dollars in his pocket. There are also explicit statements from other heads of state, such as the president of Brazil, a huge country, that they would be happy to continue receiving immigration from the Middle East. In general, South American countries have a very large Arab and “Palestinian” population, and lots of room and demand for more. The

fact that the Israeli media are not overjoyed to publish this doesn't mean that it's not true. These are facts.

There is already considerable emigration now, despite threats to emigrants from Judea and Samaria and the Egyptian blockade on Gaza, and as soon as Israel allows emigration – with property, without danger of being killed and with a generous emigration grant – then there is no doubt that emigration will increase substantially, and they certainly have where to go.

But what about the moral flaw in applying sovereignty over Judea and Samaria without granting full citizenship to the Palestinian residents?

We are told that there is no sovereignty without citizenship, but that is a lie. The United States captured the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico, for example, and didn't grant full citizenship to their residents. Israel, which was established in order to establish a state for the Jewish people in the Land of Israel, may create a separate citizenship status, while ensuring the protection of the human rights of non-Jews. Our opposition to automatically giving the right to vote to non-Jews immediately upon the application of sovereignty is a matter of principle; it's not instrumental. The State of Israel was established to be the state of the Jewish people, and it must express this principle and defend it in its system of government. This is not a moral flaw; on the contrary, citizenship is a precious matter and all the most democratic and most enlightened countries treat those who were not born in them with the same careful "stinginess." What I'm suggesting about citizenship is no different and is even more accommodating here and there compared to the accepted practice, and is self-evident, moral, legal and what have you, in all the most enlightened democracies.

And what about the Gaza Strip?

Gaza is a complex story, but in the end, there will be no other alternative and the solution there will be the same. During Operation Protective Edge, I objected to the incursion into Gaza if the purpose of going in was just to leave again.

How do you think the world will respond to this plan?

The State of Israel is stronger today both politically and economically, and world superpowers depend on it no less than it depends on them. When Israel stands up for the truth and for its moral foundations, the world accepts it. And when Israel gives in, just the opposite happens. At the initial stages, there will be pressure, and we will have to face it. The world will condemn us, the media (especially the Israeli media) too, but if we bear in mind that justice is with us, we will persevere, and the condemnations will pass and justice will endure.





Full Sovereignty

The Haetzni Family

Partial annexation and Arab autonomy



Elyakim Haetzni is a lawyer and columnist, a pioneer of the Jewish community of Hebron and one of the first residents of Kiryat Arba. He was a member of the Haganah and one of the founders of Shurat Hamitnadvim, a volunteer organization in the 1950s that fought social injustice and political corruption. He served as a Knesset Member for the Tehiya party (1990-1992).

Nadav Haetzni is a lawyer, journalist and radio presenter, and served as the legal counsel for the Company for the Location and Restitution of Holocaust Victims' Assets.

Boaz Ha'etzni is a columnist, a leader of Homesh First, a grassroots organization aimed at reversing the disengagement from Homesh in northern Samaria, and was a candidate for the Knesset for the Likud.

Rationale

"We need to build a ship with sails. When you sail out to sea, you don't have an insurance policy for the direction of the wind, but you can maneuver the sails. The ship is the statement that this is our land, and we will maneuver the sails as much as it takes to keep this country. What did Zionist thinkers think in the 1920s? They said to themselves: We have a ship and we will raise its sails and set sail for Jewish sovereignty. We will overcome all the obstacles – the British, demographics, the security situation. We will circumvent them, we will skip over them – but we will never lose sight of our goal, not even for a moment. Today, we have forgotten the goal, and every obstacle defeats us. We must never forget the goal: the return to Zion, the return of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel to sovereign rule."

- The proposed plan is not perfect. When the situation is less than ideal, the solutions are also less than ideal.
- Israel should declare that in view of the Palestinians' overt and long-term violations of the Oslo Accords, the accords are canceled and Israel no longer considers itself bound to uphold them.
- Any plan must begin with the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority. The PA never became a true partner and remained the PLO, the essence of which is the destruction of the State of Israel.
- A division into regional municipal administrations dismantles the Palestinian national collective and the aspirations to realize it, but at the same time, preserves the tribal-clan division, thus making it possible to maintain a stable system to manage daily life.

Borders

- The plan calls for full annexation of Area C and the application of Israeli law to it, based on the principle of “maximum territory and minimum Arabs.” Also to be annexed are the Jordan Valley, the Judean Desert, the Israeli settlements and the roads leading to them.

- Arab autonomy will be established in Areas A and B.

- Jerusalem: The separation fence will be torn down and the Arab neighborhoods will become an integral part of the city.

Citizenship and rights

- The Arab residents residing in annexed areas will have a status similar to that of the Arabs of east Jerusalem: residency with the option of Israeli citizenship, subject to a security check.

- In the annexed area, infrastructures will be built and full rights will be granted, in accordance with status.

- Residency rights will be revoked from terrorist elements and members of the PLO.

- The State of Israel will encourage Jewish immigration and voluntary Arab emigration.

- Jerusalem: “Rights will be granted and obligations demanded.” The Shuafat refugee camp will be rehabilitated, high-level services will be provided and the Israeli government will enforce all areas, such as education, income tax and construction.

Control over the territory

- Nadav: Autonomy will be granted gradually. The first step is imposing a military government over areas A and B, similar to the administration that existed prior to the Oslo II agreement. After that, autonomy will be granted on a regional or clan basis, depending on the readiness of the other side. After the granting of autonomy, an interim situation of 100 years will be declared, during which the status of the area will be clarified. The interim situation is intended to prevent annexation of the entire area followed by the granting of inferior status to some of its inhabitants. If it turns out after a long period that annexation is possible – the area will be annexed, and if not, another solution will have to be found.

- Elyakim: Israeli sovereignty will be applied to all of Judea and Samaria, and in accordance with Arab readiness, the State of Israel will delegate of its powers and grant them to an autonomy or autonomies.

- The autonomy will be a closed economy and will not be supported by the Israeli taxpayer. The State of Israel will ensure that it is conducted properly and earns enough so that the living conditions of the Arabs of Judea and Samaria do not fall below those that exist in the State of Israel.

Questions

You offer autonomy, but without national rights. Doesn't this derogate from the democratic principle?

Nadav: I agree that our solution is not perfect, but I suggest greatly improving the democratic aspect relative to the current situation, as well as relative to the situation when the area was under Jordanian rule. We on the right must strive to ensure that the residents of the Arab autonomy benefit from the best conditions in the Middle East. It is our duty and our mission. Of course, in terms of an objective test of human rights, the situation of the residents of the Palestinian Authority is much worse today than it was when they were under Israeli rule.

What about international legitimacy?

Elyakim: "The Writ of the Mandate was ratified by Article 80 of the UN Charter, and because the UN partition plan was not recognized by both sides and the Arabs launched a war, the only party entitled to claim rights in Judea and Samaria is the Jewish people – and the representative of the Jewish people in the world is the State of Israel, or the Jewish Agency. If anything, today we have an opposite problem in regard to international legitimacy. In international law, de facto situations take on a normative force. If they last long enough they become law. The Palestinian Authority already has international legitimacy. If tomorrow they build an airport near Jericho and invite a diplomatic delegate from Iran to land there, what can Israel do? Virtually nothing. The PA is a pre-state, and it must be broken up as soon as possible.

Nadav: I am concerned by the international community, but even today, we have to fight it all the time, so if we're going to fight – we should at least fight for the right parameters.





Full Sovereignty

Caroline Glick

Annexation now



A journalist, senior editor at The Jerusalem Post, and a Senior Fellow for Mideast Affairs at the Washington-based Center for Security Policy, currently standing for election for the 21st Knesset as part of the New Right party; founded and was chief editor of the satirical website Latma. Her books include *The Israeli Solution: A One-State Plan for Peace in the Middle East*; she has won many prizes for her work, including the Moskowitz Prize for Zionism.

Rationale

“Maybe we ignore the Arabs, but they are here. Twenty-three years ago, we placed them under PLO and Hamas rule, and since then we’ve been imagining that they are someone else’s problem. But the truth is that we take these Arabs into account every day, every minute, with every consideration... My argument is that there is a serious danger in leaving the situation as it is, or in any change that would leave the PLO and Hamas in power, because they are a death machine. It’s a zero-sum game: legitimization either for the PLO or for Israel. The prevailing narrative all over the world today is that we came to a land that is not ours and that we stole it. If we say that we want a demilitarized Palestinian state, we are giving up the narrative that says that this land is ours.”

- A Palestinian state in Judea and Samaria means millions of Arabs thronging to the land of Israel to recapture Al-Quds. Within a few years, the Palestinian state will become a radical Islamist state.
- Partition of the land, and especially of Jerusalem, will only make it easier for the Palestinians to conquer the Jewish state.
- Any talk of a Palestinian state or autonomy erodes the legitimacy of the Jewish people to the land of Israel and legitimizes the PLO.

Borders

- Complete, gradual annexation of the entire area of Judea and Samaria.

Citizenship and rights

- All the Arabs of Judea and Samaria will receive Israeli citizenship. No immigration of Arabs from other countries (“refugees”) into Israeli territory will be permitted.
- The right to vote will be granted only to those who did not belong to a terrorist organization or the apparatuses of the Palestinian Authority.
- Those who do not receive the right to vote will be permanent residents, like the residents of East Jerusalem, and will benefit from all other civil rights.



Control over the territory

- Israeli control should begin in those areas that the state already controls, first and foremost, in east Jerusalem: Comprehensive enforcement against terrorism is required using a method that distinguishes between those who break the law and the innocent, which benefits law-abiding citizens and punishes lawbreakers.
- Since Israeli sovereignty cannot be applied immediately, it will be necessary to first establish an expanded autonomy in the territories of the Palestinian Authority that will replace the PA and prepare the ground for naturalization and the introduction of Israeli rule.
- It must be ensured that foreign entities operating in Israel, such as the European Union, comply with Israeli law and respect Israeli sovereignty.
- Palestinian control over education should be cut back in Area C – the area that is already under Israeli civil control.
- Action must be taken to create an appropriate legal climate in the world, and expand our fabric of alliances with Asian and African countries while reducing our psychological and security dependence on the United States.

Questions

How will you persuade Israelis who see the child murderers and terrorists, and say “We don’t want to see them anymore”?

They’re not going anywhere. A 13-year-old female terrorist cannot really be hated; she’s only a child. If she were my daughter, I would be arguing with her about wearing makeup. But she grew up over there, in the Palestinian Authority, and wants to murder Jews because they are Jews.

Isn’t residency without full citizenship morally flawed?

No. We let them try self-determination, but if it’s a choice between Israeli control or terrorist control, it’s clear what’s preferable. It is also clear what’s better for them, and it is not patronizing to say that that little girl would be better off if Israel were in charge of running her school.

Isn’t that colonialism?

Absolutely not! It’s immoral to raise children to become murderers. Those who prefer life are better than those who elevate death to a supreme value. Those who raise child murderers are monsters. We need to make a distinction between a society that sanctifies life and a society that sanctifies death.

Aren't you concerned about Israel's Jewish identity or the economic cost of annexation?

Today we pay money to the Palestinians. We give them tax monies, and they don't even pay for their own electricity. If they were citizens, it would be different. We say that we'll have to pay for the Arabs, but that's an illusion – we're already paying a hostile and dangerous authority that feeds terror and is conducting a constant war against Israel. The identity of the state will not change, either. It will continue to be a Jewish state with an Arab minority. There won't be fifty percent Arabs here, because we will not allow them to immigrate here from abroad and we will encourage Jewish immigration. Furthermore, the urbanization of Arab society will affect its demographics too. If we bear in mind that this is our vision and that we are marching towards it, we will be able to handle whatever comes our way. Slowly, gradually, but there will be a goal. They too will have a horizon, a horizon of peace and democracy, not of hatred and death.

What about international legitimacy?

Once we make a decision that Judea and Samaria are part of the State of Israel, we will know how to explain the situation to the world. Today, too, we have international problems. Today too, they don't accept the annexation of Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. So what? And when Israel withdrew from Gaza, did the world accept it? The situation only got worse.





Full Sovereignty



Partial Sovereignty



Partial Sovereignty

Yoav Kisch

Autonomy plan



Partial Sovereignty

Knesset Member for the Likud, chair of the Knesset Internal Affairs and Environment Committee in the 20th Knesset, served as a fighter pilot in the IAF, was a leader of the reservists' protest in favor of equalizing the burden, has an MBA.

Rationale

“We have neither taken foreign land, nor ruled over foreign possessions, but only the inheritance of our forefathers which was unjustly conquered. And when the opportunity came, we restored it to our possession”

(Simon the Hasmonean)

- The plan will prevent the establishment of a terrorist state in Israel's heartland, on the one hand, and on the other, will enable the State of Israel to preserve its unique character as a Jewish and democratic state.
- The autonomy plan is based on the plan of the late Prime Minister Menachem Begin, with the addition of necessary changes in light of the changing reality.
- The plan repudiates the establishment of a Palestinian state and includes the cancelation of the Oslo Accords. The accords have already been de facto canceled because the Palestinian Authority violates them on a daily basis, both in its domestic and terrorist activities against Israel as well as in its international efforts to delegitimize Israel.
- The plan is complex because the reality is complex, but it can be implemented immediately.

Borders

- No one – neither Jew nor Arab – will be removed from their home.
- Sovereignty will be applied to approximately 47% of the area, in which the Jewish localities are located.
- Palestinian autonomy will be established on the approximately 38% of the remaining territories of Judea and Samaria, in which no Jews reside.
- The remaining 15% will be designated Area I (i.e. Israeli territory). The shared fabric of life will be preserved and a transportation infrastructure to connect the different parts of the autonomy will be built. Area I currently contains 13 Jewish settlements with 12,000 people, and five Arab localities, with some 8,500 people.
- A jointly drawn-up plan will enable natural expansion of the Palestinian population, including a master plan for new towns and neighborhoods.
- Israel insists on its right and claim to sovereignty over all of Judea and Samaria. Aware that other claims exist, Israel is willing to leave the question of sovereignty in the autonomous territories open for the time being.
- Jerusalem: In order to strengthen the Jewish majority in Jerusalem, the



Partial Sovereignty

city's jurisdiction will be extended to include Greater Jerusalem and will include the Jewish settlements around the city too.

Citizenship and rights

- The residents of the Arab Autonomy will be given the status of “autonomy resident” and in the long term, Israel will strive for a regional settlement that will formalize this status.
- No refugees will be allowed to enter Israel.
- An Arab residing in Judea and Samaria but outside the autonomous area can choose either Israeli residency or autonomy residency. Should such an individual choose Israeli residency, they will be given the option of receiving Israeli citizenship, in accordance with the Citizenship Law.
- Jerusalem: Residents of neighborhoods that according to this plan will be cut off from Jerusalem currently have Israeli residency. Their status will not change in the proposed plan, but they will be offered the option of relinquishing Israeli residency and being given the status of autonomy resident, similar to the Arabs living in Area I in Judea and Samaria.
- Incentives will be offered to transition the education system in neighborhoods that will be cut off from Jerusalem, from the Palestinian education system to the Israeli state-Arab system.

Control over the territory

- The Palestinian Authority will be dismantled and the Israeli military administration in Judea and Samaria will be abolished.
- The Palestinian autonomy will be led by an administrative council elected by the residents of the autonomy. The council's authority will be derived by virtue of special Knesset legislation. The council will be elected according to the principles of democratic elections as they are held in Israel.
- Administrative matters relating to the residents of the autonomy will be subject to the authority of the administrative council. The council will establish and operate departments that correspond with government ministries in the areas of education, transportation, religion, construction, health, agriculture, finance, trade and industry, tourism, labor and welfare, the department of refugee rehabilitation and the legal and police supervisory department.
- Security in the entire area between the Jordan River and the sea will be entrusted to the State of Israel.
- A committee of representatives of Israel, Jordan and the administrative council will be established to formalize legislation in the autonomous area. The administrative council will also appoint one of its members to represent it before the Government of Israel for discussions on matters of shared concern. The Council will also appoint a member to represent it before the government of Israel to discuss matters of common concern. Similarly, the council will appoint a member to represent it before the government of Jordan on matters of common concern.
- Jerusalem: A special proposal will be submitted for the management of the holy places that will ensure freedom of access and worship for the members of all religions.

Questions

Aren't you merely offering a watered-down version of the Oslo Accords? Israeli territory, an area under a Palestinian autonomy that has its own parliament and shared territory, with the IDF being the only party responsible for security (which largely is the case today) and no one evacuated from their home?

The big difference between Oslo and the autonomy plan (beyond the territories and sovereignty) is that Oslo gives the Arabs a false hope regarding the identity of an independent state. The new autonomy does away with the discussion on the establishment of yet another state between the Jordan and the Mediterranean.

Isn't a willingness to relinquish the claim of sovereignty over the areas of Palestinian autonomy a de facto a recognition of the Palestinians' right to a state, or at least legitimacy of their claim to a state in Israeli territory? Aren't you encouraging them and causing them to think that this 38% is a gambit that indicates recognition of their demands?

I am postponing the application of sovereignty over the 38% of the territory because currently that would be a mistake. But even if it is not yet possible today, in the future it may be possible after a change in the balance of power and perhaps with regional cooperation.

Isn't the idea that millions of people who are not citizens of any country will be living in Israeli territory, and have no voting rights in the parliament that makes the major decisions about their lives democratically flawed? Can such a move withstand international criticism?

There will always be international criticism. It will not be any different from the criticism currently being leveled at Israel when the application of sovereignty is being postponed.





Partial Sovereignty

Yoaz Hendel

Minimizing the area of dispute



Head of the Institute for Zionist Strategies, currently standing for election as a member of the Blue and White party; has a PhD in history, is a lieutenant colonel in the reserves, served in Shayetet 13, Israel's Navy Seals; in 2011-2012, served as the prime minister's Director of Communications and Public Diplomacy. He is also a radio presenter and newspaper columnist, and has written a number of books, including *In an Unsown Land: An Israeli Journey* and *Let the IDF Win: The Self-Fulfilling Slogan*.

Rationale

"There is no absolute solution to the conflict. It is impossible to achieve peace with the Palestinians and it doesn't matter what we offer them. The status quo is no longer an option. The Zionist interest is maximum territory with a minimum of Arabs"

- It is impossible to annex all of Judea and Samaria because of the demographic danger, as well as because of the high economic costs involved in naturalizing the entire Palestinian population.
- The 1967 lines are irrelevant. The lines separating Jews and Arabs need to be drawn on the basis of Israeli interests – as a kind of limited "Alon Plan."

Borders

- 30% of Judea and Samaria, those areas that include the settlement blocs and the Jordan Valley will be annexed.
- Limited Palestinian sovereignty already exists at this time in approximately 40% of the territory of Judea and Samaria, in Areas A and B. This area will be upgraded politically (i.e., will be defined as an expanded autonomy or state minus), and Israel will make sure to create territorial contiguity, with bridges in the problematic areas: Ma'aleh Adumim, Tapuah junction and Kiryat Arba-Hebron.
- The remaining area, about 30% of the territory of Judea and Samaria, home to some 100,000 Jews and a similar number of Arabs, will be declared "disputed" or "undefined" territory and will not be annexed to the territory of either party. This is the current definition of all of Judea and Samaria, and this definition will be narrowed to include only 30% of the territory, which will remain under Israeli security control.
- Jerusalem: east Jerusalem, with an emphasis on the Holy Basin area, should be developed as part of full Israeli sovereignty. The five neighborhoods outside the wall are under fake sovereignty. In this area, the residency status of those residing in these neighborhoods will be revoked (approximately 120,000 people) and municipal funding will be halted.
- Gaza is an enemy state and will be treated as such.



Citizenship and rights

- Arabs residing in areas that have been annexed will receive full Israeli citizenship.
- Jerusalem: The State of Israel will have to decide whether the neighborhoods to be removed from Jerusalem are part of the “Jerusalem envelope” – that is, a new municipal authority, or part of the Palestinian Authority.

Control over the territory

- The Palestinian Authority is already at this time a de facto demilitarized state according to all the definitions of political science. The future entity may define itself by any name it chooses.
- Internal Palestinian control will be over political and economic issues, but security and decisions on the refugee issue will remain in Israel’s hands.
- The Temple Mount will be declared part of the State of Israel, an Israeli police station will be established on it and the Jews will be allocated an area where they will have full freedom of worship.

Questions

If the Palestinian territory has no crossings or airports, you are actually closing them. Is there a precedent for this anywhere else in the world?

Of course. That’s how it was in Japan and Germany. There are countries that lost wars, and they have a presence of foreign armies in their territory. We are not a foreign army. Security control is crucial; otherwise, we will find ourselves repeatedly embroiled in the cycle of bloodshed.

Isn't granting legitimacy to a Palestinian state a destructive move?

The Palestinian Authority currently acts like a state and that’s how the world treats it. Every leader who comes to visit in Israel also visits in Ramallah. The words don’t make any difference; what makes a difference is security control, safeguarding the land, and the possible separation between us and the Palestinians – separation that prevents an independent state but allows for maximum political separation. My plan is not perfect, but it’s practical, because in my opinion, the Israeli right must present a plan.

Yisrael Aumann

Arab autonomy and absolute separation



Partial Sovereignty

A mathematician, Nobel Prize laureate in economics and winner of many other prizes; his main research field is conflict situations and decision-making; a professor emeritus at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, a member of Professors for a Strong Israel.

Rationale

“There will in fact be two separate entities...

The only thing that will remain in our hands will be security, and besides that, everything else will be in their hands. “

Borders

- No one – neither Jew nor Arab – will be removed from their home.
- A demilitarized Arab entity will be established that will be responsible for all aspects of the life of the Arabs, apart from security. Its territory will include all, or almost all, of the Arab localities in Judea and Samaria.
- The parts of Judea and Samaria in which the Jewish localities are situated will be annexed to the State of Israel.
- Two separate road networks will be established in Judea and Samaria, one Arab and one Jewish. At intersections of Arab and Jewish roads, one will cross over the other, with no possibility of passage between them. A small number of soldiers or police can be stationed at every such intersection.
- Only a small number of border crossings will be allowed to remain to enable passage from the Arab entity to the Jewish state.
- Jerusalem will remain Israeli. The neighborhoods outside the fence will be transferred to the Arab entity, and the option of moving the fence so that the Arab entity includes more Arab neighborhoods may also be considered.

Citizenship and rights

- Arabs will be citizens of the Arab entity.
- Arabs residing in areas that are annexed to the State of Israel will receive full citizenship and rights.
- No Arab refugees will be allowed entry. If the situation changes in the future, the topic may be reopened for discussion.

Control over the territory



Partial Sovereignty

- The Arab entity will have full responsibility for all aspects of civil life.
- Security control over the entire area will remain in Israel's hands.

Questions

Is there a precedent for this anywhere in the world?

In Germany, during the Weimar Republic, East Prussia was isolated, in the middle of Poland. I suggest taking this a little further – not absolute isolation but roads, and what is most important – no barriers. I talk to Arabs and the checkpoints are one of the things that bother them the most.

The argument is that as long as you set the borders and you control security, you are in fact imprisoning them.

Every country has borders. US citizens are also imprisoned within their borders. Security control? Absolutely! Until they calm down, if they calm down. Only security control.

You are proposing a demilitarized Palestinian state? Isn't that apartheid?

The idea that territorial contiguity was the right thing a hundred or two hundred years ago is irrelevant today. Everyone is yelling “apartheid,” but it's not apartheid – it's separation. There is separation between Canada and the United States too, and territorial contiguity shouldn't be a problem.

Naftali Bennett

Israeli Marshall Plan in Judea and Samaria



Chair of the New Right party, former chair of the Jewish Home party, Minister of Education and Diaspora Affairs in the 20th Knesset and a cabinet member, former director of YESHA Council and a founder of the My Israel movement; served in the Sayeret Matkal special forces unit and was a high-tech entrepreneur, was active in the “Reservists' Protest” and later served as the chief of staff of then leader of the opposition Benjamin Netanyahu.

Rationale

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not the sum total of the State of Israel. We have many more areas of interest and tasks, and the key is to stand strong... Every person, family and nation live for years with unresolved problems. A person with juvenile diabetes can live a good life with an unresolved problem. He manages it. There is something childish about insisting that every problem has a solution, and often, when you strive for the perfect solution you bring about disaster. It's something very Western to think that everything is resolvable. The big mistake is to turn yourself into a hostage of the one thing you do not know how to solve.”

- The program in of itself is not sacrosanct. It presents a framework for long-term policy and should always be open to reflection and change. However, there are several guiding principles:
- No party other than the State of Israel shall be given sovereignty over the land west of the Jordan River.
- Security responsibility for the entire territory between the Jordan and Mediterranean will remain in Israel's hands.
- There will be no concession of land and no Jewish settlements will be evacuated.

Borders

- Area C will be annexed gradually, starting with Ma'aleh Adumim and Gush Etzion. The Arabs residing in Areas A and B will be given civil autonomy. No one will be expelled from their home.
- The autonomy will not have territorial contiguity but residents will enjoy continuity of movement and transportation. All members of the Arab population will be able to move freely throughout Judea and Samaria without having to cross through checkpoints. To enable this, a tunnel or bridge connecting the Ramallah area (Benjamin) to the Bethlehem area (Judea) will be built.



Citizenship and rights

- Area C Arabs residing in areas that are annexed will be granted the option of Israeli citizenship or residency.
- Arab schools in the annexed areas will be allowed to take the Israeli matriculation exams, or offered this option in addition to the option of taking the Jordanian matriculation exams.
- An Israeli “Marshall Plan” will be launched in Judea and Samaria involving the development of joint infrastructures and investments in the transportation infrastructure; Highway 60 will be turned into an expressway; a special cross-border tourist route will be established, (with a security check only at the entrance), which will include Haifa, Nazareth, Nablus, Jerusalem and Bethlehem; the possibility of establishing a land port in Judea and Samaria will be examined, along with the allocation of a number of docks in the Haifa port to Palestinian trade, which will be managed by Palestinians, with responsibility for security in Israel’s hands.
- More cities and neighborhoods will be built according to the Rawabi format – modern cities with high-rise buildings.
- Jerusalem: A special emphasis will be placed on services provided to citizens and law enforcement in east Jerusalem, especially in the areas surrounding the Old City. Governance in Jerusalem will serve as a model of governance for all the annexed areas.

Control over the territory

- The Arabs residing in Areas A and B will elect their own government. Currently, it's the Palestinian Authority, which Israel maintains, but if it collapses, that should not concern us.
- For the time being, no Palestinian airport will be built. Should an airport be built in the future, the entry and exit of Palestinians will not be restricted, but Israel will retain control over the entry of refugees and security.

Questions

You are in fact making the Oslo Accords permanent.

I take reality as it is. I cannot reinvent history and I don't want to get into theoretical discussions.

So the left was right?

In part. In 1995, I was a company commander in the Ramallah area, at a time when we only needed a single company to control the area. Rabin and Peres arrived by helicopter to observe the paving of the Ramallah bypass road, which is currently the main traffic artery. I remember the tremendous resistance on the part of the settlers to these roads. We were wrong. We sometimes make mistakes, and that's okay. In retrospect, the bypass roads have proven to be the greatest catalyst for the accelerated growth of the settlements.

You would be leaving the Arab residents here without political rights. It that at all possible or moral in today's world?

I completely reject that assertion. If a body controls a particular region, and it is elected in democratic elections by its public, and if it has a parliament and no one else interferes with it – those are political rights. Although I retain security and demographic control, I have no desire to plan their lives. In 2006, democratic elections were held in Judea and Samaria and Gaza. To be sure, it is not a state, but there are precedents for complex situations elsewhere in the world. The one-hundred-year-old Western attempt to impose nation-states on the Middle East has collapsed. So, should we mess it up in the only place in the Middle East where the concept actually works pretty well, in Israel of all places?

How do you make the world accept the program?

In talks with diplomats, the conflict is never the first subject that comes up. The first thing that comes up is Israeli innovation, the second is how to cope with terrorism and remain a democratic state and the third is cyber security. Somewhere between the fourth or fifth point the Palestinian issue comes up, and when they say, “We don’t agree with construction in the settlements,” I respond, “Okay, you have things I don’t like either. I get it.”

Aren't you afraid of international sanctions?


I will say just one thing: Since the BDS movement began in 2006, our national product has roughly doubled itself. In the war over the hearts and minds, we have to fight, but I won’t give up my body or heart – our homeland – because of sanctions.




Partial Sovereignty



Partial Sovereignty




Regional Plan



Regional Plan

Amir Avivi and Benjamin Anthony

The New State Solution in the Gaza Strip



Anthony is a native of England, a graduate of Manchester University, a reserve officer in the Second Lebanon War up to Operation Protective Edge. He is the founder of Our Soldiers Speak, which brings together senior Israeli military officials and policy makers with students around the world, and is a regular adviser to senators, the American House of Representatives and senior academics. He lectures to Jewish lobbyists and federations such as AIPAC and CUFI, and is the founder of the New State Solution (NSS) initiative

Amir Avivi is a Brigadier General (res.), a former commander of the School of Military Engineering, head of the auditing and consulting department of the Israel defense establishment, and commander of the Sagi Brigade, which is responsible for the Negev and the Egyptian border; has a BA and MA in political science and an MBA, and is a graduate of the National Security College. Avivi is the director of the New State Solution initiative

Rationale

“We want a sovereign Palestinian state without any restrictions living alongside the State of Israel rather than inside it. We want a real and sustainable solution that will be effective for another 500 years, and that is why the solution is not feasible on an area only 70 kilometers wide holding two states that absorb aliya and immigration. We need to bring more territory into the discussion. The two-state solution as we know it ignores Gaza... We say, let's start from Gaza.”

- The demographic concern is in fact the fear of giving Palestinians the right to vote in Judea and Samaria. This plan neutralizes the threat of millions of Palestinians having the right to vote in Israel.
- If a Palestinian state is established in Gaza, the legal and civil issues in Judea and Samaria will also be less significant, because the Palestinians will have an option to exercise full civil rights in a state of their own.

Borders

- The Gaza Strip will be expanded southward: Up to ten percent of the territory of Sinai – territory equivalent in size to that of Judea and Samaria, and rich in natural resources – will be annexed to the Gaza Strip. A Palestinian state will be established in this territory.
- The autonomous areas of the Palestinian Authority in Judea and Samaria (Areas A and B) will remain in Palestinian hands, and Israel will be able to decide whether to apply Israeli law to them or to leave them, temporarily or permanently, as autonomous territory.
- The border crossings into the new state and back from it into to Israeli territory will be carried out via regular international border crossings.
- Jerusalem is the capital of Israel and will not be divided. The Palestinians will have to set a new capital in the new state in Gaza and northern Sinai.

Citizenship and rights

- The Arab residents of Judea and Samaria will be given incentives to move to the new state. If they decide to stay in Judea and Samaria, their right to vote will be exercised in the new Palestine in Gaza.
- The seat of the Palestinian political leadership, be it the Palestinian Authority or any other entity, will be in the new Palestine. Should Judea and Samaria remain an autonomous Palestinian area, it will have a local government.
- The State of Israel will maintain religious freedom in the holy places.

Control over the territory

- Israeli law will apply throughout the State of Israel, including in Judea and Samaria, with a definition of the nature of the Palestinian autonomy in Judea and Samaria – as Israel wishes to define it.
- The new Palestine in Gaza will enjoy full sovereignty over all areas within its territory.

Questions

Sinai is currently Egyptian territory. What would make Egypt agree to hand over its territory the Palestinians?

Egypt is in dire straits today: It suffers from famine, security and economic distress, and it has lost its leadership position in the Arab world, and certainly in Sinai, whose northern part is almost completely controlled by ISIS. Egypt is already having difficulty exercising its sovereignty there. Recent years have seen a decline in Egypt's status in the Middle East and all over the world. Trump's decision to visit Saudi Arabia rather than Egypt also is a bad sign and the Egyptians desperately need help and a change in their status. If the world offers them a deal whereby Egypt receives assistance and on the other hand, it is given the opportunity to be the one that enables the Palestinians to fulfill their dream of a state, it could happen.

You mentioned ISIS in the area. How can this threat be neutralized?

We have to eliminate ISIS in Sinai in a targeted manner. This has been successful in other areas when the decision is made to do it, and this threat can be controlled in Sinai as well. Unlike other areas, eradicating the problem in Sinai will not lead to the birth of another problem, and there are no Iranians waiting to enter the vacuum. If the problem is addressed in a targeted manner, the task leads to a solution – which, incidentally, is another good reason why Egypt should agree to the idea.


It's very interesting to look at that area in Google Earth at night and at the same time to look at Israel. Israel is very dense and bright while the Sinai is dark. Sinai has a very sparse population that consists mainly of Bedouin clans that split between Gaza and Sinai after the agreement with the British in 1906. This is why the cultural makeup there is very similar to that of the Palestinians.


How do you intend to convince the parties?

Our team, which is involved in this solution and is made up of senior officers in the reserves, did an in-depth analysis of the interests of all the parties. All the parties, including the Western world, the Sunni world, especially the Egyptians and the Palestinians, have substantial interests that can be promoted by means of this idea. In the West, the idea has been very well received and it is easy to demonstrate that what we are proposing is a sovereign and free Palestinian state, unlike Oslo. The Sunni world wants to get closer to Israel and prepare itself for the real threat, Iran. Everyone understands today that Gaza is in a difficult situation and that it's time to propose a broad-based solution to this problem. It's hard for me to see two million Palestinians in Gaza opposing the idea that actually saves them. Today, the interest of the Palestinian residents in Judea and Samaria is to get as close as possible to Israel and to integrate into its economy. It is in our interest that this happens, but they should have Palestinian citizenship. Our solution gives everyone what they really want.

Do you think the world will cooperate on the initiative?

We've been presenting our plan in the world for more than a year. We presented it to members of Congress and senior policy advisers, the British Parliament, the Polish Secretary of State and research institutes in the United States and Europe. We've visited dozens of universities in the United States and Europe, and we've met with students from all over the world who've visited in Israel. We can say, not with 99% certainty, but with 100% certainty, that there is tremendous openness to the idea from all parts of the political spectrum, Jews and non-Jews, left and right, students and government officials, liberals, conservatives and what have you. With that kind of sweeping support abroad we can come to politicians in Israel and tell them there is someone to talk to, and that there is also a great deal of interest in the Arab world.






Regional Plan

Yigal Cohen-Orgad

Palestinian autonomy With a Jordanian partnership



Chancellor of Ariel University, has a BA in education and an MA in economics and business administration; was finance minister in the Shamir government and served as a director in a variety of companies including Bezeq, the Israel Electric Corporation and Bank Leumi. He won the Moskowitz Prize for Zionism in 2013.

Rationale

“I have almost no doubt that in the long term, we will achieve peaceful relations between ourselves and the Arab population and our neighbors. This will only be possible when the Palestinians realize that they will never get a better deal. From this point of view, Oslo caused us to revert 20-30 years back, because it fostered in the Palestinians the feeling that they could successfully apply the Phased Plan – in which it is the first stage is a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders and the second stage is a Palestinian state in all of the land of Israel. That is why the necessary but insufficient condition for any solution is that the Palestinians understand that the Phased Plan is irrelevant, and that what we are offering them is the best deal they can get.”

- Israel does not need to withdraw from its territory, but it does not necessarily have to annex it either.
- The Palestinian Authority is harmful, and the establishment of an alternative Palestinian Authority is a bad idea.
- Discourse is an important principle. The plan must be presented publicly so that we can discuss alternative solutions.

Borders

- No territory will be annexed to the State of Israel. Priority should be given to Jewish settlement in Area C, and Arab settlement in Areas A and B. Israel and Jordan will jointly administer the Judea and Samaria expanse.
- Israel will propose to the Egyptians to add area from Sinai to the Gaza Strip to absorb refugees, and in return will give it a thin strip along the current border, and additional benefits.

Citizenship and rights

- The Arab localities will be under Jordanian sovereignty, and the Jewish communities will be under Israeli sovereignty. A unique solution will have to be found for Hebron, which is a special case.
- The Palestinian population living in Judea and Samaria will be given legitimate political expression in Jordan and they will vote twice: once for the Jordanian parliament and once for the local Palestinian administration – which will replace the current Palestinian Authority.
- A system of roads will be constructed from Jenin to Hebron to create a single traffic continuity and spare the Arab population the need to go through checkpoints.

- In joint work with the Jordanians, Israel will immediately address the water and sewage infrastructures and the rehabilitation of refugee camps.
- Joint industrial zones will be built for Jews and Arabs, like the one in Barkan.

Control over the territory

- Control over security and crossings will remain in Israel's hands.
- Other issues, such as water, land and settlement, should be discussed until an agreement is reached.
- Israel will be responsible for investment in the territory and its development, with an eye to the future, for example by laying gas pipelines in Judea and Samaria in preparation for the start of gas production.

Questions

There is currently a similar arrangement on the Temple Mount: Jordan is involved and so are the Muslim Waqf and the Palestinian Authority. That experiment did not succeed, so why pin hopes on that kind of mixed involvement, but on a much larger scale?

The Temple Mount is super-cosmos in terms of its complexity, but a microcosm in terms of area. What happened on the Temple Mount after the Six Day War was not an agreement of the kind I am referring to, but rather the abrogation of responsibility and an unwillingness to exercise our sovereignty. It is not necessarily a good example, because it is a site that ignites the Middle East in a way that ten wells in south Mount Hebron do not. The model that I am proposing is based on the assumption that both sides have arrived at the conclusion that they want to live with this arrangement. On the Temple Mount, no one wants to live with the arrangement, that's why it's always on the verge of exploding.

Why should the Jordanians agree to such an agreement?


In my opinion, Jordan has an interest in finding a solution that will first prevent the existence of a Palestinian Hamas state. A state of that kind would be a threat to Jordan in its current form. We are currently providing Jordan with a safety net, and we will also offer Jordan access to the Mediterranean and economic benefits, including water, and an international solution to their refugee problem. What the Jordanians are afraid of is that they will be considered traitors for collaborating with the Jews. That is why we must first create the facts on the ground – roads, water, economic instruments and more. I confess that there are problems here from the perspective of the Jordanians, and if this plan is published tomorrow morning, they will come out unmistakably and firmly against it.


Given the precarious situation in the Middle East as a whole and especially in Jordan, is there any value to a document we sign with the Jordanians, certainly when it's one that is so complicated and convoluted?

Security, which is the most important concern, remains in our hands. We remain on the Jordan and thanks to our monopoly on military power – our forces will not lose their strength if there is a coup in Jordan.


Will the world accept the arrangement you offer?

In order to enable this plan to take root, we must first penetrate the heart of the Israeli center and American Jewry. Although not a sufficient condition, it is a necessary condition: There are several important aspects: The plan guarantees our vital security needs, and in terms of values, it gives Palestinians political rights






Regional Plan




District Plan



District Plan

Dr. Mordechai Keidar

Eight Palestinian Emirates



District Plan

A scholar of Arab culture and lecturer in Arabic at Bar-Ilan University, he is a former chair of Professors for a Strong Israel and a former chair of Israel Academia Monitor. He writes and interviews extensively in the Israeli and international media, in English, Hebrew and Arabic.

Rationale

“Anyone who tries to solve the problems of the Middle East using European methods and mechanisms is like someone trying to fix his Chevy in a bicycle shop. The problems in the Middle East need to be solved using the methods of the Middle East. The foundation stones of Western democracy cause an allergic reaction in Islamic societies. Peace in the Middle East is not given to those who want it and beg for it – and certainly not to those who demand Peace Now. Peace is given only to those who are not vanquished, to those who have the power, and the desire and willingness to use it. Their neighbors give them peace not out of love but out of the understanding that the price of non-peace is too high.”


- This is a religious conflict and there can be no religious solution as long as an independent Jewish state exists.
- What is needed is to work from a sociological perspective on Arab society and the adaptation of the political framework to one that suits its nature. A successful model from the West will not succeed in the Middle East, because the culture here is different.
- There are currently two types of Arab countries: failed and successful. The failed type failed because they are artificial amalgamations of tribes, ethnic, communal or religious groups. This model can be seen in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Yemen and more. In these countries, there is no loyalty to the modern state but rather only to the traditional group. The unifying identity of the modern state failed in its attempt to replace the traditional conflicting loyalties. This is also the situation among the Palestinians: The culture in Gaza is very similar to Bedouin culture, and in Judea and Samaria, there are hardly any Bedouins, just the city and the village. Even weddings between cities and villages, and mixing between city and village are rare.

The second model in the Arab world, the successful one, is the Gulf emirates. These are stable countries and not because of their oil, but because each emirate has only one dominant tribe, and the other, smaller groups have no ambition to rule. The leaders of the emirates come from the same family that has led the tribe for hundreds of years, and that is why the state is perceived as belonging to everyone and no one acts against it.

- The Palestinian Authority is a fiction because it too is an artificial amalgamation of tribes. Abu Mazen has not set foot in Hebron, Nablus or Qalqiliya for years. The solution to the problem of the conflict must follow the successful model of the emirates, in the context of which any city that is actually a tribe or a group of tribes will be self-governing, a city-state.

Borders

- The borders of seven emirates – city-states – will be defined throughout



District Plan

Judea and Samaria: Jericho, Jenin, Ramallah, Nablus, Arab Hebron, Tulkarm and Qalqiliya. The eighth emirate already exists in Gaza, where it has already had a government, a legal system, borders and a legitimate governmental structure since Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip in June 2007.

- Israel will apply sovereignty over the rural areas surrounding the city-states in Judea and Samaria, and border crossings to and from the city-states will be established.
- Jerusalem will remain the united capital of Israel under Israeli sovereignty in the entire city, including the Temple Mount.

Citizenship and rights

- Each emirate will have its own passport and government, and a governmental and economic structure that serves its citizens.
- Each emirate will sign a separate agreement with Israel that will formalize common areas of concern, such as water, electricity or access to an airport and seaport.
- The State of Israel will assist in promoting the economic interests of all the emirates.
- The refugee problem was created by the Arab states that refused to accept the 1947 UN Partition Plan and launched a war against Israel in 1948 just one day after it declared its independence. The problem has been almost completely solved, but is being kept on artificial life support by UNRWA, an organization that must be dissolved. Israel will help rehabilitate the refugee camps but no “refugees” from other countries will be allowed entry.
- The rural areas of Judea and Samaria to be annexed to Israel include about 10% of the residents in this area, who will be given the opportunity to receive full Israeli citizenship.

Control over the territory

- Each emirate will be responsible for the control of its territory and the State of Israel will control the countryside in the environs of the emirates.
- Local sheikhs and tribal chiefs will head the local government structure.
- Movement in the area will be possible with visas and arrangements signed in agreements.

Questions

You are not actually proposing a state but rather enclaves, because the State of Israel will still control the territory.

You have to give it a positive name, which comes from the Arab world and the sociology of the Middle East. Those are the rules of the game. We will not be inside the city-states, but will take care of our interests and security from without. If there is peace and quiet, the sky is the limit. I have discussed this plan with Arab leaders, including tribal leaders, and they all told me that it made a lot of sense. Certainly more than the illogic behind the establishment of the PA.

The only place where this program is implemented – Gaza – does not inspire optimism.

While it's true that they're not nice to us, that doesn't change the fact that they are a state. By the way, Gaza was the first to break up the Palestinian dream of a united state, because it is already at another stage in every respect. I supported the idea of leaving Gaza – not in terms of how it was done but in principle – because I think that settling in Gaza was not the right thing to do. I wanted to see Gaza is separate from us because it was too much of a demographic and security burden.


What will practical life look like in the Emirates vision – in terms of security, water issues, freedom of movement and so on?

I'm an architect, not an engineer, and I'm just laying out the general format. Anything significant in professional terms – water, electricity, roads, etc. – will be planned by the relevant professionals. Everything will be determined in separate agreements with each emirate individually. If they want to establish a federation, I have no problem with that, as long as they do not have territorial contiguity, which would mean terrorist contiguity. Regarding security, must bear in mind that wherever the clans rule according to their tradition in the Middle East, they drive the jihadists out and tell them to go to hell, because they threaten the clan regime, its social stability and governmental hierarchy.


Does your vision have international feasibility?

I recently met with a representative of the Middle Eastern Desk in the US State Department. I asked him if they had a way to ensure that a Palestinian state would not turn into a Hamastan. Somewhat embarrassed, he said: "I never considered that." I took this plan to the heads of the political establishment in Israel, including senior advisors, and they explained to me that the Americans would block the plan. But when I went to American senators, they told me that the plan makes sense, but that I would first have to convince the prime minister of Israel.


But the more important question is whether it has local feasibility, in Judea and Samaria. The answer is that it absolutely does, since everyone knows that there are no marital ties between the cities of Judea and Samaria, because each considers all the others "not one of us." Every city has its traditional leadership that comes from the clans and they are the legitimate leaders, unlike the criminals we brought here from Tunisia, led by the butcher Yasser Arafat. No one considers Abu Mazen a legitimate leader since he is not a native of Judea and Samaria, having been born in Safed. Almost every night there are street fights between the local tribes of Nablus and PA soldiers, because they don't consider the PA a legitimate government, but rather foreigners that the Zionists foolishly imported.



District Plan



District Plan



“All that is Hebrew within us was given to us by the Land of Israel; all the rest that is in us – is not Hebrew. The People of Israel and the Land of Israel are one. In the Land of Israel we were born as a nation and there we grew up. And when the storm came and we were taken from our land’s borders, we could not grow any more, just as a tree ripped out of the ground cannot flourish, and our entire life was reduced to protecting our national singularity, that which the Land of-Israel caused to thrive and nourished.”

(Ze'ev Jabotinsky)

My-Israel is Israel’s largest grassroots organization dedicated to promoting Zionist activism online and on the ground. The organization drives change by empowering its more than 200,000 followers to take action to defend Israel, counter BDS and strengthen the Israel-Diaspora relationship.

Website (Hebrew): www.myisrael.org.il

